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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses three questions: why has universal potable water access not been 
achieved with the water policy changes made in Bolivia between 1990 and 2000? What can be 
learned from the water policy changes implemented in Chile between 1980 and 1999? Finally, 
what changes can be made to both countries’ water policies to ensure the sustainable use of water 
resources? To answer these questions, this thesis reviews water policy changes in Chile as a 
result of World Bank loans before privatization in the 1980s and compare them to the water 
policy changes in Bolivia as a result of World Bank loans in the 1990s in the form of water 
privatization. I argue that water privatization is neither the solution to lack of water access nor 
the solution to water scarcity. Secondary sources were used to analyze the historical differences 
of water policy in Santiago, Chile and La Paz, Bolivia to see the effectiveness of privatization as 
a universal water provider and a solution to water scarcity. The results show that the water policy 
changes that were implemented in Santiago, Chile before privatization were more effective in 
supplying affordable water to citizens than the immediate privatization in La Paz, Bolivia. I also 
analyze the effectiveness of water privatization in both countries, as it pertains to the scarcity of 
water resources in each region. I argue that privatization of the water sector failed to prepare for 
water scarcity and I recommend institutional pluralism with sustainable water policy at the 
forefront as a solution to lack of water access and threat of water scarcity in Bolivia and Chile.  
 4 
INTRODUCTION 
 Global water supply is decreasing worldwide, bringing water resources to the forefront of 
policy concerns. A government’s need to provide universal water access to its citizens is a global 
issue as it is necessary regardless of level of economic development. In recent decades proposed 
water policies have been implemented in South America to solve the lack of quality water access 
to urban citizens at affordable prices. La Paz, Bolivia and Santiago, Chile are two cases in which 
national governments changed water policy in order to improve water allocation, with distinct 
results. Influenced by neoliberal economic frameworks, both countries introduced water policy 
changes centered around the privatization of water resources. 
David Harvey explains that neoliberalism was the “guiding principle of economic 
thought and management” in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Harvey 2007: 2). He defines 
neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being 
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free 
trade” (2). To implement these ideals, neoliberalist thought encourages the creation of markets in 
order to act as “an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and 
substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs” (3). It is for these reasons that neoliberal 
leaders such as those in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) during this time 
period encouraged governments to use market exchange to maximize the distribution of social 
goods by bringing “all human action into the domain of the market” (3).  
 One of the frameworks neoliberal theorists introduced in this time period was the 
privatization of national enterprises such as gas, water and electricity. In this paper, privatization 
is defined as the “ownership of built facilities and the right to profit from the use of those 
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facilities” (Maestu 2013: 4). Governments in Latin America privatized these utilities in an effort 
to encourage investment and efficient allocation of resources by introducing them to free market 
activity. As part of privatization, the Bolivian government changed the water utilities to private 
companies and sold them to international water companies in order to bring expertise and 
international investment into its water systems.  
The Chilean government however, created a water market in which private water rights 
were sold to individuals. The distinction between these private water rights and privatization of 
water utilities is important in this paper because one is the privatization of a company in which 
the company has the right to the water rights within the city as well as build and profit from 
facilities that distribute water to citizens. So in the privatization of water utilities, a private 
company is given rights to water resources in the city in which it operates. Private water rights 
however allow for a water market in which the rights to access water resources can be bought 
and sold. This market will be further explained later in the paper. 
 The 1970s economic recession in Latin America led to the implementation of neoliberal 
economic policies that encouraged the privatization of public resources such as water, gas and 
electricity (Spronk 2007). The privatization of water resources in Bolivia, was a mixture of 
policies implemented by President Sánchez de Lozada as a condition for receiving international 
aid from the World Bank in the 1990s (Laurie and Crespo 2007; de la Fuente 2003). Bolivian 
water policy changed as the water systems were sold to private foreign companies in an effort to 
use the foreign investment and revenue gained from the commodification of water to provide 
universal water access in its cities, La Paz and Cochabamba (Laurie and Crespo 2007). 
The late 1990s and early 2000s in Bolivia experienced public sector privatization, social 
unrest and political turmoil as the government tried to follow international advice and privatize 
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state enterprises such as water, gas and electricity (Spronk 2006). The debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused the World Bank to intervene in the Bolivian national economy and encourage 
privatization with “full cost recovery” in which all costs should be paid for by users and the 
elimination of water subsidies by the government (de la Fuente 2003:98). The Bolivian 
government started with the privatization of other industries such as mining which led to 
increased unemployment and urban migration of citizens in search for jobs (Spronk 2006). The 
increased populations in urban areas such as La Paz and Cochabamba created a demand for the 
expansion of water services and President Lozada, with the influence of the World Bank, 
introduced the privatization of the water company SEMAPA as a way to provide that (Spronk 
2006). Privatization in La Paz and Cochabamba in 1997 and 1999 respectively led not to 
universal water access for their citizens, but instead led to social movements that demanded that 
the newly privatized water companies leave the country and the municipal water system return to 
government control (de la Fuente 2003; Laurie and Crespo 2006).  
 In 2000 a social cooperative, Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida, led 
protests with up to 50,000 people in which they demanded the removal of the monopoly on water 
rights given to Aguas del Tunari, the international company to which the government sold the 
water system in 1999 (Spronk 2006). After renegotiations to which the government agreed to 
lower water prices to their original level within two months, but after failing to meet its 
promises, the Coodinadora built blockades and 100,000 people protested in the street (17). The 
Coordinadora successfully expelled Tunari on April 9, 2000, returning the water system back to 
the government (17). 
 Social movements inspired by the Coordinadora against Agues del Illimani, the 
international company that bought the water system in La Paz and El Alto, started in 2000 as 
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leaders in El Alto joined the Coordinadora from Cochabamba to make its own branch to protest 
the monopoly Illimani held over the water resources in the city (Laurie and Crespo 2006). The 
consequent Federation de Juntas Vecinales de El Alto (FEJUVE) would lead the movement 
against Illimani for the next five years until in 2005, the company agreed to leave the city and 
sell the water company back to the government (Laurie and Crespo 2006: 844). 
 In addition to the universal potable water provision, water privatization is a proposed 
solution to water scarcity as the market price would encourage consumers to use less water and 
therefore protect water resources (Perry, Rock and Seckler 1997). As different as the water 
policy change implementation was in Santiago and La Paz, the ecological results were similar. 
The decrease in the size of glaciers that feed the water sources La Paz due to climate change and 
the “over exploitation of water basins” in Chile are leading to year-long droughts causing the 
cities to suffer from water shortages (Martinez 2017; Lagorio 2014a: 1). Changes in water policy 
and the implementation of privatization has not led to the ecological protection of water 
resources as it was proposed to do as a side-effect of creating universal water access for citizens. 
 The history of water policy in Chile is comparable to that of Bolivia as the change in 
economic policy that came with the Pinochet government (1973-1990), privatized major public 
enterprises including the water sector (Bauer 1998). This type of privatization is different than 
that of Bolivia because private water rights were granted to individuals, while in Bolivia, 
universal water rights to all water resources were sold to a single company. In addition, the 
Chilean water company, EMOS, implemented two major water rehabilitation projects with the 
financial aid of the World Bank in 1980 and 1986 which managed to expand water infrastructure 
and develop a price system that subsidized the poor users. Chilean water policy changes occurred 
over the course of nineteen years (1980-1999) as a way to provide universal potable water access 
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in Santiago before the privatization of EMOS in 1999, and succeeded. Even with this successful 
hybridization of the water system in Santiago and the eventual privatization of EMOS, however, 
Santiago is facing water scarcity due to the regression of glaciers and pollution of mining 
companies, just like La Paz (FSRN 2016; Archundia, Duwig, Spadini, Uzu, Guerdrón, Morel, 
Cortéz, Ramos, Chincheros, and Martins 2017). 
 
Research Question and Hypothesis: 
 Water availability is important as it is necessary for life. It is at the forefront of peoples’ 
minds in Bolivia and Chile as they see their water resources depleting and suffer days without 
water due to rationing. Water policy is becoming increasingly important as water scarcity 
threatens to limit water availability and therefore the lives of citizens in Santiago and La Paz. My 
questions are: 1.) Why has universal potable water access no been achieved as a consequence of 
the water policy changes in Bolivia between 1990 and 2000? 2.) What can be learned by 
comparing the Bolivian case with the water policy changes implemented in Chile between 1980 
and 1999?  And 3.) What changes can be made to both countries’ water policies to ensure the 
sustainable use of water resources in the future?  
I hypothesize that the success of the Chilean water market changes lies in the slow 
implementation of the changes as well as the changes as a social development investment on the 
part of the water company. The investment made by Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Sanitaria 
(EMOS) in the Santiago water system led to the successful allocation of water and a price system 
that allowed all users to afford it. Meanwhile the failure of the Bolivian water policy changes lies 
in the absolute control over water resources given to a foreign private company, which sought 
profit rather than expansion for the fair distribution of this social good, along with the quick 
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implementation of privatization without investment or policy change beforehand. I think that 
institutional pluralism, investment in technology and encouraging societal understanding of the 
finite nature of water resources will be necessary to ensure the sustainable use of water resources 
in other countries. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Water Allocation: 
Water allocation law has been in effect since Ancient Mesopotamian times as humans 
have tried to fairly distribute one of the most important resources in our world. It was created to 
regulate the use of water resources as a public good to ensure that the use of water by one citizen 
did not impede the use of the same resource by another citizen (Cech 2005). Every ancient 
empire expanded on the rules and regulations in regards to water allocation, the first of which to 
name their code being the Roman Empire. The Romans dictated the Common Law of Water, or 
the Riparian Doctrine. According to these documents, “water in a stream belongs to the public 
for use by fisherman and for navigation and cannot be controlled by private individuals” (Cech 
2005: 213). Another idea implemented in the Roman Law is “reasonable use,” meaning use is 
limited to that which contributes to production as long as navigation is not interrupted. 
Additionally, the Riparian Doctrine required landowners to return any diverted water back to the 
stream or river after use without any change in quality or quantity. With the Spanish in the 13th 
century, the government altered the Riparian Doctrine to make water resources the property of 
the crown. This shift is important to my project because the Spanish influence upon Latin 
America was so significant through colonization and remains significant today. 
 The Spanish government created Las sietes partidas as their governing doctrine for water 
allocation that claimed that all “water, land and minerals” belong to the crown (Cech 2005: 214). 
According to the partidas, private ownership required special permission from the crown but 
rainfall and water flow could be accessed without such permission. When the Spanish Empire 
stretched to the New World, it used the sietes partidas to give colonizers autonomy to extend 
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water allocation so as to make the land more productive and therefore more profitable for the 
crown. With Madrid so far away from the colonies, the crown allowed each town to regulate 
their own water allocation and often encouraged the continuation of water allocation systems put 
in place by native populations. Water allocation was seen as a necessity for growth and 
sustainability and was divided up as such to fairly supply all of the inhabitants of a city or town 
(Cech 2005: 215). Today, water is not as ubiquitous as it once was. Freshwater resources are 
depleting and becoming polluted and human demand for the resource has increased along with 
population, leaving a difficult set of decisions to be made in the way of adequate dispersion and 
equal access for all.  
 Latin America is known for its lack of “development” compared to the “more developed” 
nations in North America. There are numerous strands of thought as to why this is the case 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). One of the most prevalent issues today is water allocation and 
the potential for limiting growth and development within Latin America (Easterly and Serven 
2003). Geographically speaking, Latin American countries have a wide array of environments 
from forest to arid lands to coastal regions. This makes water allocation difficult because some 
areas have access to plenty of water while other areas have none. On top of this, climate change 
is altering the game in regard to the amount of water available in different places. Because of 
this, water allocation is becoming increasingly important and countries are seeing the need to 
reorganize their allocation systems in order to protect their industries, citizens and land.  
One suggested solution to global water scarcity is water privatization (Perry , Rock and 
Seckler 1997). Treating water as an economic good has the potential to encourage investment in 
the water sector, and limit usage as people recognize that increased usage leads to higher prices 
and lower supply (Perry et al. 1997). Because of people’s inescapable need for water, however, 
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water privatization faces criticism particularly when its implementation has proven to be 
difficult. Efforts to privatize water in Latin American have led to social movements demanding 
water as a human right rather than an economic good.  
 In most countries, including Bolivia and Chile, water is considered a public good, 
meaning that all citizens have the right to use it. Problems arise however when the use by one 
citizen affects the use by another, meaning contamination, overuse, or rerouting, known as “third 
party effects” or “externalities” in this context (Donoso 2006). Furthermore, governments can 
often not afford to supply good quality water to all of the country’s citizens because of inefficient 
infrastructure, lack of engineering expertise, and corruption.  
In the mid 1900s, Latin America adopted protectionist policies such as import 
substitution to try to keep wealth and economic growth within the country. As such, the 
governments were responsible for the supply and management of multiple industries that were 
not able to attract foreign investment. While Import Substitution Industries (ISI) sparked 
significant economic growth for Latin American countries, high interest rates and lack of foreign 
direct investment caused economic stagnation, and their international debt grew, bringing the 
World Bank to intervene in the economies of these countries. As a result of the increased 
international debt, the international lenders sent economists to the indebted countries such as 
Chile and Bolivia. Economists encouraged privatization to spur foreign investment and spark 
economic development to lead to the end of international debt. Since these economists 
recommended privatization as the solution to economic stagnation, the World Bank set 
privatization of public services as a requirement to receive financial aid (De la Fuente 2003). 
In the 1980s international aid corporations encouraged developing countries to adopt 
liberal economic reform as a stipulation for continued financial aid. As such, many Latin 
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American countries privatized their public industries, such as electricity, mining and water. The 
process of privatization cost many citizens their jobs, encouraged urbanization and increased the 
prices of these goods so much that citizens and social movement organizations resisted the 
privatization brought by the “developed world”. While each country underwent a unique reform, 
results were often similar as citizens started movements to fight the privatization of their 
industries.  
Privatization fits into the school of thought known as Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) through which academics and water experts have tried and are trying to 
enhance global water availability. IWRM is defined as “the process of promoting the coordinated 
development and management of water, land and related resources to maximize the resultant 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of 
vital ecosystems” (Setegn and Maria Donoso 2015: 2). Privatization is a proposed form of 
IWRM as an option for water allocation expansion. A review of the scholarship on water 
privatization is useful for our purposes here. 
 
Privatization: 
Josefina Maestu, Director of the United Nations Office to Support the International 
Decade for Action “Water for Life”, defines water privatization as “ownership of built facilities 
and the right to profit from the use of those facilities” within the water sector (2013: 4). 
Privatization in the cases of Santiago and La Paz includes the unlimited water rights granted to 
the water companies in each city. The hope of water privatization is that the pursuit of profit will 
lead to better service, infrastructure and quality while also encouraging water users to limit their 
use (Maestu 2013). Privatization also would ideally bring foreign direct investment, allowing the 
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financing of water services to come from outside the country and give water companies the 
incentive to expand water supply while improving water service. 
In Maestu’s book, she describes the water trading experience in the western United States 
to demonstrate the successful use of a water market. Here, the water price system allows for 
different users to pay different amounts in order for different sectors to use the appropriate 
amount of water to remain productive. The agriculture sector, for example, is charged less than 
urban users in the western United States because its products benefit all of the citizens (Maestu 
2013). An important aspect to this water market however is the high amount of investment 
required to keep the water market running. Latin American nations often lack the technology and 
the capital to finance the same systems.  
According to CJ Perry and his colleagues, Coordinator of Research at the International 
Irrigation Management Institute, a non-profit scientific research organization focused on the 
sustainable use of water resources in developing countries, the public sector has failed in its 
responsibilities to provide water to its citizens in Latin America. In his article “Water as an 
Economic Good: A solution or a problem?” he explains that the public sector allows corruption 
to plague the water supply systems (Perry et al. 1997). Since powerful water users can bribe the 
officials in charge of water management, incentives are separate from performance (Perry et al. 
1997). These problems lead to the same inequalities that have always plagued developing 
countries; the few rich benefit from the corrupt system while the poor masses suffer.  
For Perry et al., privatization is the solution. It can free up government resources, 
encourage efficiency and allow the rich and poor to invest equally into water systems. Pricing 
systems would be set up to ensure that the water the citizens depend on for life is charged at a 
lower rate than the excess usage of water by the people who can afford it. In line with this 
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thinking, Perry describes water markets as the best way to introduce water privatization. Water 
markets would allow for water to be used according to value to individual users, and subsidies 
would allow for poor users to have water access. 
John Cohen and Stephen Peterson propose institutional pluralism as the alternative to 
privatization in public sector products. Institutional pluralism is centered around the idea of 
breaking up monopolies. To do this, institutional pluralism divides roles spatially (or 
geographically) instead of by institution (Cohen and Peterson 1999). According to David 
Osborne and Ted Gaebler, as cited in Cohen and Peterson’s book, the government should act as 
an entrepreneur that can “structure the marketplace to fulfill a public purpose” (Cohen and 
Peterson 1999: 87). This idea is that the government should also be a participant within the 
market. The idea behind their proposal is to use private market resources to facilitate the sale of 
public resources while the government monitors the market in order to assure water access for all 
citizens. This way, multiple companies (private and public) can compete to supply consumer 
demand while the government manages the market to ensure the sustainable use of water 
resources as well as affordable water access. These companies would compete within regions in 
which the local government would dictate the limitations of the market to best represent the 
population they would serve. 
 
Ecological Issues: 
The ecological effects of water use are becoming increasingly important as fresh water 
resources become scarce. Chile and Bolivia both rely heavily on glaciers for their freshwater 
supply. Climate change has resulted in significant glacier recession making citizens aware of the 
need for sustainable water resource management (Martinez 2017). Perry claims that treating 
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water as an economic good would endanger the long-term sustainability of water resources as 
companies would try to increase sales and therefore water usage (Perry et al. 1997). If 
privatization leads to financial incentives for the companies to sell more water, then the water 
resources of a country are not being used in the most sustainable way. With the recession of 
glaciers, Bolivia and Chile cannot afford to waste water resources simply for the financial gain of 
a private company, water is not a resource that a civilization can survive without. 
Professor in Water Management at the University of Twente in the Netherlands, A. Y. 
Hoekstra founded the concept of a “water footprint”. He defines a blue water footprint as the 
“consumptive use of ground and surface water flows” (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). In his 
study, Global Monthly Water Scarcity: Blue Water Footprints versus Blue Water Availability, he 
and his colleagues explain the blue water footprint of the inhabitants of 401 different river basins 
throughout the world by measuring the level of water scarcity in each region. The degree of 
water scarcity is determined by the ratio of the blue water footprint in a basin to the blue water 
available. The blue water availability is the “volume of water that can be consumed without 
expected adverse ecological impacts” (Hoekstra, Mekennon, Chapman, Matthews and Ritcher 
2012). In this study he recognizes the seasonal change in water availability and studies blue 
water scarcity by month rather than year. This allows us to see that average water availability per 
year does not accurately depict the level of water scarcity in different seasons. This is important 
because as the seasons change, water availability changes and therefore the severity of water 
scarcity also changes. Hoekstra et al. reveal that in a given year 201 basins, half of the basins 
studied, with 2.67 billion inhabitants experience severe water scarcity at least one month of the 
year (Hoekstra et al. 2012: 3).  
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Hoekstra et al. explain that many societies overuse their water resources such that the 
ecological health of the river basins is changed. His “presumptive environmental flow 
requirement” specifies that water consumption of a river basin should be less than 20% of the 
water available in order to protect the ecological health of the river basin. This is an important 
idea for water policy to acknowledge in order to produce sustainable water policies for cities that 
will allow future use of these resources. 
Although this report lacks specific data on Bolivia, the data show that areas in northern 
Chile suffer 12 months with water scarcity over 100% and areas in Argentina have up to three 
months a year of over 100% water scarcity. Water scarcity over 100% indicates that the water 
usage of the river basins in these areas is over 20% of the blue water availability and therefore is 
not sustainable. Hoekstra’s definitions and frameworks are important for the context of water 
usage and scarcity in these two countries. As increased urbanization endangers the quality of 
water, glacial regression threatens water availability. In the face of the scarcity of such a vital 
resource, experts on water management have proposed a myriad of solutions that include more 
efficient and productive water systems and keeping the presumptive environmental flow 
requirement in mind while making water policy. 
Stephen Brichieri-Colombi proposes a Water in the National Economy (WINE) strategy 
as an alternative to privatization. According to Brichieri-Colombi, water planners should be 
decision makers “over the Earth” and should be trusted to solve water scarcity with solutions 
other than increased infrastructure (Brichieri-Colombi, 2009). He proposes that we look at water 
in a socio-economic context and consider solutions that alter the demand and supply of water 
rather than the appropriate policy for the distribution of it. He believes that thinking of water 
simply as a commodity is not enough. Instead, we must now consider variables that were 
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previously considered “externalities” such as social contexts and political regimes in order to 
fully consider the water resources and availability around the world. 
Brichieri-Colombi’s theory is one not used in water policy in either country but it is 
supported by my research in that social contexts and political regimes defined the water 
availability in these countries. Furthermore, his theory of decreasing water usage as a social 
change rather than a policy or economic one is important for my study because environmental 
protection is not usually a priority in the most efficient forms of production in industries outside 
the water sector. A societal understanding for the need to protect water resources is important for 
the future so that citizens are more conscious and therefore support more sustainable water 
policy. 
All of these frameworks come into play when discussing the water policies in Chile and 
Bolivia, as both countries tried to create water systems that would finance themselves and still 
allow water access to all of their citizens through privatization. The ecological contexts of these 
countries are similar as they are both experiencing glacier regression and as a consequence, 
water scarcity. Water resources on Earth are becoming increasingly scarce and therefore 
increasingly valuable. In this paper, I research the water policies of Chile and Bolivia in an effort 
to build a holistic historical account of how water policy has affected water access in each 
country and furthermore, how those policies have prepared for the threat of water scarcity. 
Previous research has analyzed water availability for citizens in La Paz and Santiago, however 
this research analyzes these water policies as they pertain to water availability and proposes 
changes to water policy to best handle water scarcity in the future. 
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METHODS 
For this paper, I have compiled and analyzed secondary sources to depict the water 
privatization implementations in Bolivia and Chile and demonstrate how these frameworks did 
not successfully supply their citizens with affordable water nor did they protect the sustainability 
of their water resources. I use historical analysis of water policy politics to show how social 
political histories affected the water policies and how those in turn affected water availability as 
we see it today. 
I used the university library databases to collect articles on water policy in Bolivia and 
what led to the Bolivian Water Wars. As I found information on the water policy and the 
rransition to privatization in La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia, I read further into water policy 
frameworks literature from all over the world. I found the water market in Chile to be the only 
one in the world and one of three regions (including Australia and the western United States) to 
separate water rights from property rights. Since Bolivia and Chile are neighbors and water is a 
geographical resource, I wanted to compare the relative success of the water policy in Chile to 
that of Bolivia. 
I consulted studies with specific price, allocation and environmental data to compare the 
results of water policy in both countries and to propose water policy changes to provide water 
access to the citizens of each country. I compare proposed Integrated Water Resource 
Management frameworks and their implementation in each country with their respective 
outcomes to propose a water policy framework in which a societal and political shift will allow 
for water resources to be treated with financial and social value as it is a resource that is not 
solely an economic nor social good. 
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EMPIRICAL CHAPTER A: CHILE 
Water Policy History 
Carl J. Bauer, an expert in the field of water policy and water rights gives a brief history 
as it pertains to water policy in Chile in his book Against the Current: Privatization, Water 
Markets, and the State in Chile (1998). The history of water policy in Chile can be analyzed 
from the economic downturn in the 1920s and subsequent protectionist policies. The government 
invested heavily in infrastructure and industry as well as encouraged import substitutions which 
led to the virtual isolation of Chile as it closed itself off from international trade (Bauer 1998: 3). 
The 1960s in Chile were plagued with slow growth, chronic inflation and high poverty rates. 
During this time, the reformist party, inspired by the Cuban Revolution like much of Latin 
America in this era, in the form of the Christian Democrats, gained political power in 1964 with 
Eduardo Frei (Bauer 1998: 4). Frei increased the state’s economic intervention, including 
expanding state authority over water use.  
In 1967 the Christian Democrat government passed the 1967 Agrarian Reform aimed to 
redistribute wealth by redistributing large pieces of land amongst peasant farmers and farm 
laborers (4). In the process of redistributing land, the government often expropriated land 
without compensating the original owners. Frei’s socialist agenda was carried on by his 
successor, Salvador Allende, who expanded the state role in the economy and accelerated the 
actions of the Agrarian Reform (4). He nationalized private industries in an effort to immediately 
control the financial status of the nation. According to Bauer neither Frei’s nor Allende’s plans 
achieved the social equity they set out to gain, and Allende was overthrown in a military coup by 
Augusto Pinochet and his military Junta (4). 
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The authoritarian government focused entirely on free-market principles and economic 
reforms, in reaction to the socialist policies of previous leaders. With the help of the Chicago 
Boys, men who studied at the University of Chicago (the leader of academic neoliberal thought 
of the time), the new government reduced the state’s role in planning, regulation, ownership and 
provision of social services (5). The new model opened the country to the world economy by 
being export oriented and emphasizing comparative advantage.  
Debates between what Bauer calls the hardliners (authoritarian nationalists) and the soft-
liners (Catholic corporatists or gremialistas, and neoliberal economists) led to the creation of the 
Constitution of 1980. Within this constitution, chief architect and gremialista Jaime Guzmán, set 
up a “new institutional order” to set the framework for what they called a “protected democracy” 
(13). 
Part of this framework was the Water Code of 1981 in which the Chilean government set 
a basis for how water rights were to be distributed thereafter. Professor of agrarian economics at 
the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Guillermo Donoso, writes extensively of this code 
and according to him, it dictated that water is “national good for public use” (Donoso 2006: 158). 
It protected water use rights, and granted permanent, transferable water-use rights to individuals 
with the goal to create efficient allocation of water through market transactions (Donoso 2006). 
In an effort to make the water allocation system function like a free market, the Code created 
water use rights (WUR) and allowed them to be traded freely. The right of use over water has the 
same constitutional rights as those for property, allowing individuals to “use, enjoy and legally 
dispose of water with complete freedom” (159). The government made these efforts in order to 
set up a water rights market in which supply and demand would allow for water to be transferred 
from lower to higher value activities. This means that whoever values the use of the WUR the 
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most, would pay the highest price and therefore WUR owners would use them for the most 
efficient purposes. The Water Code also decreased the intervention of the government in the 
institution of water, and transferred that responsibility to water user associations (Maestu 2013).  
The definition and application of WUR is specific and complicated. Guillermo Donoso, a 
professor in the College of Agriculture and Forestry Engineering at the Universidad Católica de 
Chile, explains the different types of WUR, and how they are allocated in his article “Water 
markets: case study of Chile’s 1981 Water Code” (Donoso 2006). The application to gain water 
allocation rights includes three main components. The applicant must identify the source from 
which the water is to be gathered, with the specification of surface water versus ground water. 
Secondly, he/she must also indicate the quantity of water that will be extracted (in liters/second). 
Third, applicants are to specify which points along the source the water will be extracted and 
lastly, note whether the right is “consumptive or non-consumptive, permanent or contingent, 
continuous, discontinuous or alternating” (Donoso 2006: 160). Applicants need not be 
landowners, they can apply for water rights independently from their property ownership. 
Consumptive water use rights are surface and groundwater WUR that “does not require 
that the water be returned after being used, and the owner of this right may totally consume the 
water in any activity” (Donoso 2006: 160). Non-consumptive water rights are rights in which the 
right owner may divert water for use but must return it unaltered to its original channel (Donoso 
2006, 160). Non-consumptive rights may not interfere with consumptive water rights by altering 
quality nor quantity (160). Permanent water rights include the right to use water in certain 
amounts, measured as volume by unit of time. Contingent water rights are those that allow rights 
owners access to a water source only after permanent water rights owners have satisfied their 
needs (160). In a time of scarcity however, both permanent water rights owners and contingent 
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water rights owners split water flows evenly (160). Continuous water rights allow right owner to 
access water any time of day or night any day of the year while discontinuous water rights only 
give owners access to water for specified periods of time (Donoso 2006). Finally, alternating 
water rights allow for two or more owners to use the water resources “successively” (Donoso 
2006: 160).  
 At first, applying for WUR was free and the application only needed only be published 
in the Diario Oficial, the daily Santiago newspaper and again in the local newspaper wherever 
the applicant applied for his/her WUR (Donoso 2006). Auctions were held by the government to 
resolve any water right competition, the WUR going to the highest bidder and therefore ideally 
routing water usage to the highest value activity (Donoso 2013). Free WUR and no minimum 
requirements for usage led to water hoarding. Eventually the state discussed non-use tariffs to 
prevent false water scarcity, but they were never enforced because agricultural WUR owners 
preferred to keep their rights in the chance of water scarcity (Donoso 2013, Bauer 1998). If there 
is a societal interest in the allocation of water that cannot offer the highest bid, the President of 
the Republic can overturn the bidding process and allocate the available water accordingly 
(Donoso 2006: 162). New water rights can be granted but they must go through the same 
application process and must prove that the new rights do not infringe on any already allocated 
WUR (161).  
As far as water management however, WUR owners are mainly responsible for their 
water resources. As such, WUR owners created Water User Associations (WUA) in which WUR 
owners can manage the trading of water rights and oversee their usage. There are three types of 
Water User Associations: water communities, vigilance committees, and canal user associations 
(Donoso 2013). Water communities are any formal group of users that share a common source of 
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water. Vigilance committees include all users and canal associations on any river, river section or 
stream. They administer water and allocate water to different canals. Finally, canal user 
associations are formal associations with legal status that can enter into contracts (Donoso 2013). 
Many of these WUA have professional management, but have not updated their capacity to meet 
new challenges in order to better serve their members (Donoso 2013). 
The governmental institution responsible for monitoring and enforcing Water Use Rights 
is the Directorate General of Water (DGA) (Donoso 2013). According to Donoso, the main 
concern with the transfer of water rights is if the transfer results in a change of water intake 
location because this could change the externalities caused by the new WUR and harm another 
users WUR. The DGA must authorize water transfers in order to maintain decorum amongst 
WUR owners. In addition to this the DGA analyzes the potential third party effects caused by the 
transfer before authorization. In addition, it makes sure that new water right petitions are 
broadcasted three times through national and local newspapers. They are also responsible for 
collecting compensation for any environmental damage caused by transfer. The DGA also 
provides adequate and timely information for potential WUR buyers and sellers. Donoso claims 
that the Chilean water market would benefit from a more transparent mechanism to reveal prices 
to all participants within the water market in order to assure that all are receiving the same prices 
regardless of level of experience (Donoso 2013: 126). 
WUR are important to my study because they represent the institutionalization of water 
rights separate from land for the individual and recognize externalities as well as seasonal use, 
showing that the creators of water policy in Chile recognized the impact of water policy on the 
use of water resources. Specific to water availability, the WUR are important because they allow 
the state-owned water company to function as an individual WUR owner, not simply as a public 
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provider. This contributes to the idea of treating water as an economic good, allowing for 
efficiency and investment, just as WUR encourage the same for individuals within the water 
market. 
Santiago Water Availability 
 In order to see how the water rights changes affected the water access for citizens in 
Chile I look to Santiago and the results of water policy change in the wake of the Water Code of 
1981. The projects implemented in Santiago by the public municipal water supplier, EMOS, 
before the privatization of the company in 1999 led to the increase in water access for citizens of 
Santiago and caused the company to become profitable, allowing it to be sold for profit in 1999 
to Aguas de Barcelona-Suez (Pfleigler 2008). EMOS was granted WUR by the government in 
order to provide the city of Santiago with water access, once the company had these rights it was 
able to operate as a private company (Baer 2014). 
Santiago, the capital and largest metropolis of Chile, underwent major rehabilitation 
projects for its water allocation system in order to match the high influx of people from the 
1950s to the 1970s. In the 1950s Santiago already suffered from contaminated water sources and 
deteriorating water infrastructure, so when people migrated towards the cities, the water systems 
were insufficient to supply this growing urban population. Géraldine Pflieger in her article 
“Achieving universal access to drinking water and sanitation networks in Santiago de Chile: An 
historical analysis” gives us an overall account of the history of water policy in Santiago and its 
effects on water access for the citizens. Jorge Alessandri, the Chilean president from 1959 to 
1963, implemented a project to demolish the settlements of newly migrated people. He relocated 
them to “hard constructions,” permanent settlements built by the government (Pflieger 2008: 24). 
Eduardo Frei president from 1965 to 1970 built on Allessadri’s ideas in his operación sitio 
 26 
project in which he moved 52,000 families to new hard constructions. The problem with these 
projects is that the new constructions were often in areas of the city that did not have the 
infrastructure to supply water and sanitation services. The lack of services caused an increase in 
the number of campamentos or illegal settlements on the periphery of the city during this same 
time period (Pflieger 2008: 24).  The inhabitants of the campamentos came together to form 
social pobladores movements in which they demanded housing and basic utilities in the 1950s 
and 60s. 
Because of the high urbanization rates during the 1960s, access to water in urban areas in 
Chile was 83% in 1970 in the Greater Santiago Area compared to the 93% that had access in 
1952 (Pflieger 2008: 22). In addition to the decrease in water access for the citizens of Santiago, 
the allocation within the city was unequal. The 1970 census showed that water access in affluent 
neighborhoods was between 89 and 99 percent, while the outskirts of the city had between 78 
and 85 percent. Even more unequal in the outskirts of the Greater Santiago Area, water access 
was between 66 and 75 percent (Pflieger 2008).  
In 1973, Pinochet and his military Junta came to power and implemented a series of 
neoliberal reforms that would encourage private ownership and investment. He forcibly ended 
the construction of campamentos along with the public housing construction programs. The 
result of these actions was that the 200,000 people in the campamentos had no government 
program to help them move into safer settlements nor gain access to water and sanitation 
services. In 1979 Pinochet implemented the National Urban Development Policy in which the 
state began three demand-based approaches that encouraged individual ownership of homes.  
First, from 1985 to 1990 the subsidized housing programs produced forty-five percent of 
the new housing. Fifteen percent of the new housing developments were part of the subsidios 
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habitacionales program that allowed people to buy houses in the private market with subsidies 
up to 25% of the property value (Pflieger 2008: 27). Between 1980 and 1989 subsidios 
habitacionales built an average of 20,000 subsidized houses per year, but the people who 
benefitted from this increase in housing were part of the middle class of Santiago, not the 
population that suffered from lack of water access (27).  
The second program supplied utilities to their inhabitants as well as providing a home. 
Viviendas básicas relocated people from the campamentos that allowed them to purchase houses 
with subsidies up to 75% of the value of the property. Finally, the radicación, or the rooting, 
program rehabilitated the villas with financing from the Inter-American Development Bank. This 
program gave families the deed of ownership, a room, known as casetas sanitarias, along with 
utilities such as water, wastewater disposal and electricity (28). With these programs in place, the 
state created 48,800 new connections to water, sewerage and electricity across the Greater 
Santiago Area between 1979 and 1992 (28).  
Responsibility for the water system in Santiago before the 1970s was split across three 
different governing bodies, making regulation and management unclear. In 1976 in a move of 
decentralization, eleven independent and regional public companies took responsibility for 
regulating water systems across the country while the Empresa de Agua Potable de Santiago 
(EAPS) became the regulatory and managing force in Santiago. Later called Empresa 
Metropolitana de Obras Sanitarias (EMOS), but still the public water utility, it became 
responsible for the overhaul of the water system in Chile in the 1980s. 
In 1980 EMOS “progressively reformed” its rate structure to better cover operational and 
modernization costs and short-term investments (Pflieger 2008: 31). With this system it set up 
three rate groups in an effort to set cross-subsidies based on consumption. The first rate group 
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was for consumers that used less than 15 m3 per month, in which case their usage would be 
subsidized completely by the company. The next rate group would be for users that used between 
16m3 to 31m3 per month, they received a reduced rate for the first 15m3 and paid the regular 
price for excess usage. The final rate group was for consumers that used 31m3 to 45m3 per 
month. These users paid an increased rate for all of their water, and these increased prices were 
used to subsidize the first two rate groups (Pflieger 2008: 31). The idea was for more affluent 
households to help pay for a basic need for households that could not afford it as well as to 
encourage users to use less water and therefore protect this vital and limited resource. With this 
system in place, prices of water started at USD 0.19/m3 in 1981, decreased to 0.08/m3 in 1985 
and settled at 0.11/m3 in 1998 (Pflieger, 2008: 31). 
Part of Pinochet’s plan included allowing free-market principles to dictate the growth of 
Santiago. In a 1979 decree he drew out two zones, an urban zone and an urban expansion zone 
(Pflieger 2008). According to this plan, the state would permit urbanization in both areas, but 
was only responsible for supplying utilities, public services and improving facilities within the 
urban zone. By 1985, urbanization sprawled to only 40,000 ha of the 100,000 drawn out by the 
decree in both areas. The people that urbanized these areas were the wealthier citizens of 
Santiago, built by private contractors. These houses, since they were part of the urban expansion 
zone, were not supplied by EMOS but instead were supplied by private water companies. These 
private water companies charged higher prices than EMOS and provided approximately 42,000 
people with water as of 1983, with volumes as high as 0.69 m3/h/d (m3/household/day) (Pflieger 
2008: 38). That was at least 42,000 people whose higher prices were not contributing to the price 
system EMOS created in order to subsidize the poor who could not afford to pay for water. This 
price system created the hybrid model EMOS used as it operated as a private company with 
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revenue and investment but a public company as it used wealthier customers to subsidize poorer 
customers to allow universal water access. 
Essentially, the wealthier citizens avoided the price network EMOS set up in order to 
provide water to all citizens in Santiago, and therefore the higher rates intended to help poorer 
residents gain access to water were moot. This is important to mention because the pro-poor 
framework set up by EMOS was made less effective because the rich neighborhoods paid 
alternate water providers for their water. EMOS still managed to generate revenue from its price 
system, however rich neighborhoods redirected their wealth that would be able to help subsidize 
poor users had it been spent inside EMOS. 
 The new rate system caused the “overall revenue” from water and sanitation bills for 
EMOS to be 50% in 1979, 70% in 1982 and 90.5% in 1984, while the rest came from company 
investments and the World Bank loan (Pflieger 2008: 31). These numbers allowed for EMOS to 
attract major private investments when it launched an investment program aimed to extend and 
improve access to drinking water in 1981. Together with the USD 26 million the World Bank 
contributed to the program, EMOS was able to finish an aqueduct that would supply higher 
altitude areas, an 83 km supply network and 14 new reservoirs (Pflieger 2008: 32).  
 All of this is important to show that the government-led water policy change through 
EMOS was effective in gaining revenue for years after it implemented the change, but forces out 
of the company’s control limited their success. According to Pflieger, the revenue EMOS 
intended to collect from the rich households went to alternate water providers instead of helping 
finance water supply to poor residents. The Water Code of 1981 allowed for EMOS to function 
as a private entity, owning water rights and selling water at a competitive price with the intention 
of attracting investment. At the same time the Water Code also allowed alternate water providers 
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to compete for the same customers within the Santiago Metropolitan Area. In Santiago the 
disadvantaged people still did not have a consistent water supply as the richer citizens continued 
to enjoy water access provided simply by their wealth.  
 
Results of Water Policy in Chile 
In 1986 the World Bank and EMOS teamed up again for a second loan to improve water 
sources in Santiago to decrease the occurrence of typhoid fever caused by water borne bacteria. 
This project aimed to “upgrade potable water quality and increase available water quantity by 
improving operation and maintenance and reducing water losses in the water distribution 
system” and “to strengthen the management and cost control system” of EMOS (World Bank 
1996: ii). The results of the second World Bank- EMOS project are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Water Supply Project Scope for Santiago 
 Estimated in SAR (km) Actual (km) 
Primary Distribution Pipes 
(300-1200mm) 55 94.1 
Secondary Distribution 
Pipes (75-300mm) 46 32.9 
Reservoirs: new 9 (65,000m3) 18 (242,500m3) 
Reservoirs: Rehabilitation 1 (20,000m3) 3(44,000m3) 
Wells 5 5 
Pressure Control and 
Macrometering Not quantified Part of Civil Works 
Source: World Bank 1996 
 The Table quantifies the total length of distribution pipes that the rehabilitation project 
built in comparison to the amount it was projected to build. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) 
created at the beginning of the project predicted the creation of 55km of Primary Distribution 
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Pipes (100-1200mm) when in reality, at the completion of the project in 1995, it had created 
94.1km of Primary Distribution Pipes. The project also overshot its expectations in new 
reservoirs by creating 18 reservoirs with a capacity of 242,500m3 instead of 9 with a capacity of 
65,000m3. The trend continues with the number of rehabilitated reservoirs by rehabilitating 3 
rather than 1 with the capacity of 44,000m3.   
 The success of this project and the data that shows how it exceeded the expectations of 
the World Bank provides evidence that EMOS was an efficient company with the appropriate 
technicians and professionals to use the aid given by the World Bank to directly benefit its users. 
As we will see later, these results contrast those of the Bolivian water rehabilitation project.  
An important aspect of this project is that EMOS supplied close to 70% of the financing, 
meaning that the World Bank actually invested less money than it originally planned. According 
to the World Bank Implementation Completion Report, “EMOS was able to finance the 
additional costs from internally-generated funds as a result of the improvement in its financial 
position” (World Bank 1996: iii). This made the water system economically sustainable because 
EMOS could afford to operate independently.  
In 1989, EMOS became a shareholding company of which the government company, 
Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) bought 64.6% of the shares, the Chilean 
government itself bought 35% of the shares and private shareholders bought 0.4% of the shares 
(World Bank 1996: 3). CORFO, founded in 1939, is a public investment company whose 
mission is “to improve the competitiveness and the productive diversification of the country by 
encouraging investment, innovation, and entrepreneurship, strengthening in addition the human 
capital and technological capabilities to achieve a sustainable and territorially balanced 
development” (CORFO 2015). Additionally, because of the Water Code of 1981, the 
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government was required to buy into the company just as any other investor would. Combined 
with investments from private investors who would benefit from the increased construction that 
would follow the expansion of the water network, EMOS was able to fund the majority of the 
rehabilitation project (Pflieger 2008: 31).  
 The EMOS expansion also increased the prices of water enough so as to decrease the 
average consumption of water throughout the city from 35.8m3 per connection per month in 
1987 to 31.6 m3 in 1994 (World Bank 1996: iii). Price hikes between 1989 and 1990 equaled 
50% and by the end of 1998 had almost doubled, allowing the company to profit and average of 
$40 million USD between 1992 and 1996 (Pflieger 2008: 43). Even with these price hikes 
however, the level of water consumption did not decrease. This is important to mention because 
one of the arguments for water privatization is the claim that unsubsidized prices would lead to 
the decreased usage of water resources. This example shows that even with subsidized prices, the 
increased prices did not decrease the level of water consumption. The success of the price system 
led the World Bank to grant EMOS another loan in 1987 of $60 million USD to help expand 
water infrastructure and sanitation even further (Plieger 2008, World Bank 1996). 
 In 1988-1990, the government of Chile created an autonomous body with judicial and 
economic power in the water sector, implemented a tariff to ensure the long-term financing of 
the service and created a system to help low-income consumers pay their water bills. The 
Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SSS) was in charge of “granting concessions for water 
and sewerage services, setting standards for the sector and controlling compliance with them and 
calculating tariffs and controlling their implementation” (World Bank 1996: 2). These reforms 
would help make EMOS sustainable for the future and keep water access to citizens cheap 
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enough to afford while still making enough revenue to invest in water infrastructure throughout 
the city. 
 The institutional and rate changes that EMOS implemented in the 1980s and 1990s were 
incredibly important in the construction of water system infrastructure and water allocation 
within the Santiago Metropolitan Region. EMOS set up a social economic market by 
implementing the new rate system it created in the 1980s that started a pattern of pro-poor water 
systems in which the poor users are subsidized by the richer ones. The water market The money 
given by investors allowed EMOS to function as a private entity still concerned with public 
service and state. Through these changes EMOS was able to reach a level of efficiency that 
would rival the private water suppliers that targeted affluent neighborhoods. Furthermore, the 
framework that EMOS implemented during this time prepared it for the partial privatization of 
the company in 1999, allowing the international company that bought EMOS function within a 
water system that was already set up to serve the entire city, not just the rich citizens (Pflieger 
2008: 41). 
 The privatization of EMOS in 1999 was a result of the democratically elected 
Concertación wanting to attract investment in order to finance an improvement and expansion of 
wastewater treatment facilities (Baer 2014). The government sold 51% of EMOS shares to 
Sociedad Inversiones Aguas Metropolitana, a consortium including French company Suez 
Lyonnaise del Eaux and Spanish company Aguas de Barcelona (157). In 2001 the company 
name was changed from EMOS to Aguas Andinas, a name it still carries today (157). Up until 
1999, the water companies in Chile, including EMOS, were “still private businesses meaning the 
assets were still in the hands of the state although they were managed like private companies” 
(156).  
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Chilean Ecological Story 
Donoso and Bauer both criticize Chile’s Water Code and reform for allowing the overuse 
of water resources (Bauer 1998, Donoso 2013). The Water Code allows for individuals to sell 
seasonal water rights between industries that only require heavy water use for part of the year. 
According to them, allowing heavy water use year-round split between to industries is causing 
water resources to be used to the point of scarcity (Bauer 1998). While this issue mainly affects 
rural areas, water rights are especially sensitive as water use upstream affects those downstream, 
or what experts call externalities. With the water market in Chile, as water resources become 
scarce, the price of water will only increase, encouraging WUR owners to hold onto their rights 
in order to use them in times of scarcity. 
Even with all of the water policy changes in Chile, Santiago still suffers from water 
scarcity today. Pollution, droughts, heavy rains and landslides threaten potable water access for 
the citizens of Santiago.  Social protests and heavy criticism of Aguas Andinas’ (the water utility 
that serves Santiago) lack of investment in preventative infrastructure are evidence that 
ecological changes threaten water availability (Gracia 2017). Sources report that 84% of the 
fresh water resources in the country flow into the Pacific Ocean without being used. With 
evidence such as this, thousands of citizens in Santiago have taken to the streets to demand the 
re-nationalization of the water supply systems and many of Chile’s senators have called for water 
nationalization (Gallagher 2016). 
Climate change is causing water scarcity and affecting water availability in the Maipo 
River basin, the basin responsible for 70% of the water supply to Santiago (FSRN 2016). Glacier 
retreat between 1995 and 1997 for the glaciers surrounding Santiago has been reported to be 
between 0.2 km2 and 2.8 km2, meaning that water availability in Santiago is decreasing (Rivera, 
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Casassa, Acuña and Lange 2000: 50-51). Pollution and flooding of the river basin create dirty 
water that the citizens cannot drink, leaving millions without water for days as Aguas Andina 
tries to deliver water to its customers. Furthermore, water delivery in emergency situations is 
often unsanitary and requires citizens to re-chlorinate their water individually (Reuters 2016). 
In the past 10 years Chile has bounced between drought and flooding, both of which 
leave millions of people in Santiago without water. Chile was plagued by drought for 8 years 
from 2007 to 2015, leaving the reservoirs at 66% capacity (Lagorio 2014c).  This shift in the 
environment forced the government to reconsider water policy and search for emergency 
measures to take in order to provide access to potable water for its citizens. Paired with 
interspersed flash floods, leaving millions of people without water, Chile is in a situation today 
that will require an overhaul of its water policies.  
Finally, a project called Alto Maipo is threatening the water availability in Santiago. The 
project, driven by a multinational company based out of the United States, plans to reroute the 
river in order to flow through an energy generating turbine to supply a nearby mine (FSRN 
2016). Citizens have protested this project for seven years, explaining that the construction of the 
turbine would cause serious pollution to Santiago’s major water source (FSRN 2016). 
Competition over resources between citizens and the mining industry is not uncommon in the 
history of resource availability in Chile. The industry is so large that mining often dominates the 
demand for water and energy resources. Mines in Chile require large amounts of freshwater to 
successfully run, but they cause pollution in the drinking water for citizens and often take away 
water resources that would otherwise be used for citizens. Because of this, the government and 
mining companies are looking to invest in desalinization as a way to provide their own 
freshwater instead of taking from the resources needed to provide for the people (Craze 2015). 
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  The importance of discussing the water scarcity problems in Chile is that even though its 
water market and Water Code are considered a success in the minds of neoliberal economists, the 
“short-term, profit-driven resource management” did not prepare the country for the water 
scarcity that they are facing now (FSRN 2016). We are reaching a point in time where 
capitalization and profit at the cost of natural resources is no longer an option. Water availability 
is decreasing and policy is going to have to change to address this new problem in nations where 
water supply is insufficient. 
 All of this information shows that even with the systematic changes made before 
privatization, and the privatization of the water system in Santiago, water resources are still 
becoming scarce. While EMOS was able to set up a pro-poor framework and price system to 
better supply water access to all of the citizens in Santiago, it was not able to set up a framework 
that would minimize water use. Water resources in Santiago are becoming scarce and as of 1999, 
the privatized water company, Aguas Andinas, has not been able to build a framework in which 
the water resources of Santiago are protected, nor one in which they are used most efficiently. It 
is important to note however, that water scarcity was not a major focus for the changes EMOS 
made in the 1980s and 1990s. Privatization has not created a water market in which the 
sustainable use of water resources is being implemented. Perhaps returning to a hybrid 
private/public water entity such as EMOS would provide more success in this area since profit 
was not the driving force for  EMOS. 
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EMPIRICAL CHAPTER B: BOLIVIA 
Water Policy History 
The economic downturn in the 1980s brought international attention to Bolivia as 
economists sought to implement their new theoretical frameworks as solutions to the economic 
problems of developing nations. The International Monetary Fund suggested the country 
implement Jeffery Sachs’ “orthodox shock.” With this new ideology, the Bolivian government, 
with the help of German economists, developed the New Economic Policy (NEP) which called 
for the shrinking of the government as an industry owner and called for the privatization of most 
services, such as water (Spronk 2007: 10). Also contributing to the dialogue of water resource 
reform was the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, 1992, Article 
5.2 of which states that “Water should be considered an economic good having a value consistent 
with its most valuable potential use” (ICWE 1992). This conference and the frameworks 
developed there dictated economic and social water policy in the years afterward, encouraging 
governments to privatize their water companies in an effort to modernize technology and 
decrease water usage. 
As part of this “shock”, water specialists implemented water privatization in both La Paz 
and Cochabamba, Bolivia. Without the specification of water rights that Chile implemented, the 
water rights in Bolivia were property of the government to grant to the new water companies as 
it saw fit which gave those companies universal and undeniable rights to all water resources in 
the cities. In both cases, water privatization sparked social movements (in the early 2000s) that in 
turn ousted the international companies from Bolivia in the hopes of returning water to a national 
right. The Bolivian government had struggled to provide its citizens with water at an affordable 
price, and in an effort to spark investment into water infrastructure as well as meet World Bank 
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and International Monetary Fund stipulations for international aid, it implemented water 
privatization along with the privatization of most public resources in the late 1990s (oil, gas, 
energy etc.). This included closing mines, which resulted in 31,000 public servants being laid off 
and the elimination of the power that the labor unions and movements held. Also, as part of this 
program, NEP architect Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada pushed the privatization program which he 
called “capitalization” in 1993 when he was elected president, in which he moved to privatize 
most public utilities, including gas, electricity and water (Spronk 2007: 10). 
As a result, the government sold half of the shares of public utility companies to foreign 
companies, and the other half to private Bolivian companies (Spronk 2007). La Paz, the biggest 
city in Bolivia underwent its privatization process in 1997, two years before the implementation 
of the Cochabamba privatization. Aguas del Illimani, a French company, won the bid for the La 
Paz/El Alto concession, which gave it water rights for 40 years (Laurie and Crespo 2007: 843). 
In both cases the government entered a “concession” with the foreign private companies, defined 
by Cohen and Peterson as an agreement between the government of a nation and a private 
company (Cohen and Peterson 1999: 89).  
Servicio Autónomo Municipal de Agua Potable Alcantarillado de la Paz (SAMAPA), the 
water company of La Paz (Bolivia’s largest city) underwent a privatization process in 1997. 
Aguas del Ilimani, bought water rights within La Paz with concessions allowing them undisputed 
water rights for 40 years (Spronk 2007). The concession signed by Illimani and the Bolivian 
government included requirements for investment by the company into the water system in order 
to improve infrastructure and expand water access to more citizens (Laurie and Crespo 2007). 
The price system Illimani implemented was intended to charge citizens only for water they used 
and included a price system similar to that of EMOS in that there were different prices for users 
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with higher consumption than those of lower consumption. There was a problem with water 
meters however, and poorer households often paid a minimum charge that significantly exceeded 
their water usage, and therefore was too expensive for citizens (Laurie and Crespo 2007). 
 In 1982, 65% of the population of La Paz had access to the public water system. In 2001, 
that number increased to 84% of the city’s population (Poupeau and Hardy 2016). Although the 
water systems grew to reach more people, these numbers only include the La Paz “served areas” 
because Illimani focused on the profitable areas of the city (Spronk 2006). Ilimani’s contract was 
considered “pro-poor” because the number of connections to the water system increased during 
their tenure as water system monopolist, regardless of where those connections were made. 
Here, a “territorially-based” organization, known as the Federation de Juntas Vecinales 
de El Alto (FEJUVE), gained traction as it demanded the return of water rights to the public. In 
2000 FEJUVE organized “all out” strikes across the La Paz-El Alto concession, forcing the 
government to meet with the organization to reach an agreement (Poupeau and Hardy 2016: 
844). Their cries were not heard however until 2004 since Illimani admitted to showing false 
evidence of “expanding” the water systems beyond what it was previous to their arrival (Poupeau 
and Hardy 2016). 
The contract that the Bolivian government signed with Aguas del Illimani is considered a 
“pro-poor” water concession. This distinction was awarded to the contract for its mandate for the 
extension of water services and water tariffs based on consumption (Laurie and Crespo 2007). 
The mandate for expansion was intended to require the company to invest in the expansion of 
infrastructure and services to a larger area and therefore a larger amount of people, in an effort to 
include poorer neighborhoods. Tariffs based on consumption would allow people who use less 
water (usually in poorer neighborhoods) to pay lower water bills than those who used more 
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(usually in richer neighborhoods). The problem with this system was that the water meters often 
did not accurately measure the amount of water usage, or not many poor households had water 
meters. Therefore, poorer households were required to pay a minimum usage fee that was 
significantly higher than it would be if they had been charged only for the water they used 
(Laurie and Crespo 2007). 
In 1999, the government sold the Cochabamba water systems to Aguas del Tunari in an 
effort to increase water infrastructure and water availability for the peripheries of the city. Law 
2029 granted Aguas del Tunari exclusive and monopolistic rights to all water resources within 
the Cochabamba area, which would also come to include the surrounding territory (Spronk 
2007). The contract between the government and the new foreign private company included 
commitments on the part of Tunari to expand the water network to a larger area, in order to 
include the peripheries of the city with the poor citizens. It also, however, guaranteed the 
company profitable returns for 40 years. On top of this, the World Bank specified that no public 
funds were to be used in the expansion of the water system in the interest of full market 
potential. Since no government funding could be used, all of the profits guaranteed to Tunari for 
40 years had to come from the citizens in the name of increased rates. Not only were people 
charged higher rates for water services from Tunari, but citizens who lived outside the boundary 
of Cochabamba, who had constructed their own wells and water systems, were charged for their 
water also.  
At the time of privatization, only half of the population was connected to the public water 
system (Spronk 2007). Aguas del Tunari did not expand the water infrastructure as promised and 
the price hikes of up to 200% for water meant fewer people had access to water. The government 
of Cochabamba never offered any solutions to the outraged people and in 2000 social 
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movements succeed in kicking the company out of the country. With people out of work and 
therefore out of workers’ unions, they formed alliances according to their neighborhoods. 
Neighborhood leaders rallied people in the name of injustice as the access to water was 
categorized by geographical location. These citizens, who worked as domestic servants, street 
vendors and casual laborers joined together to fight the privatization of their water system and 
reclaim their rights to water.  
Susan Spronk, a professor of International Development and Global Studies at the 
University of Ottowa, describes in her “Roots of Resistance to Urban Water Privatization in 
Bolivia: The ‘New Working Class’ the Crisis of Neoliberalism and Public Services” a new form 
of union, as a union of neighbors rather than a union of coworkers. As such, when the protesting 
union Coordinadora succeeds in removing Aguas del Tunari as the owner of water rights within 
Cochabamba, they were unable to set up a system that successfully allocates water resources to 
the citizens of the city. The Coodinadora’s efforts to solve the water crisis were thwarted as 
customers demanded lower prices for water and workers within the water system demanded jobs. 
Cochabamba struggled between the growth of water services and the decrease in costs, all 
without the capital to solve either one. To add insult to injury, in 2005 the Inter-American 
Development Bank required the water system to employ less people as a contingency for 
receiving international aid. Additionally, Aguas del Tunari sued the Cochabamba government for 
the $25 million they should have made in profit for the investment they made into the company. 
All of these discontinuities added to the water crisis in Cochabamba in the early 2000s (Spronk 
2007). 
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La Paz Water Availability 
Although the price hikes and social movements in La Paz were not as dramatic as those 
in Cochabamba, I analyze the results of the water privatization scheme in La Paz to see how even 
the “pro-poor” concession did not successfully provide water to all of the city’s citizens. In both 
cities, international interference in the water sector led to social movements that demanded the 
human right to water in the face of economic stagnation even with the new neoliberal capitalist 
water systems.  
The results of water privatization in La Paz Bolivia are mixed. The pro-poor contract 
between Aguas del Illimani and the Bolivian government required the company to expand water 
infrastructure to more citizens. The lack of specificity in this requirement, however allowed 
Illimani to increase the number of household connections in accordance with the contract 
without expanding water access to citizens in poor neighborhoods. The contract did not specify 
geographical requirements for the connections and therefore gave Illimani the opportunity to 
expand only where profits could be found (Laurie and Crespo 2007). 
The Bolivian government sold all water rights to Aguas del Illimani, a French water 
company, in an effort to bring water expertise into the area and expand its water system in La 
Paz and El Alto. Spronk explains that El Alto was the poorest and most indigenous city in 
Bolivia at the time of privatization and therefore there were 200,000 people in El Alto that were 
not included in the city’s “served area” for the water system. This meant that the water company 
drew a line around La Paz and El Alto that excluded the peripheries of those cities. Furthermore, 
according to Spronk, there were 70,000 people that were inside the “served area” but could not 
afford the water supplied by Aguas del Illimani.  
Table Two shows the results of the attempted privatizations in terms of changes in access 
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to improved water and sanitation systems for households in Cochabamba and La Paz. The 
number of households in Cochabamba served by the water system increased from 44% to 63% 
between 1992 and 2001, a 19% increase (World Bank 2004: 173). The same city experienced 
increased access to improved sanitation systems, from 45% in 1992 to 67% in 2001, a 21% 
increase. The table also shows that La Paz experienced similar results. Access to improved water 
services increased 14% and access to improved sanitation systems increased 20% (World Bank 
2004: 173). 
 
Table 2: Percent of households with access to improved water and sanitation systems in La Paz 
and Cochabamba 
City % of households 
with access to 
improved water 
systems 
 % of households 
with access to 
improved sanitation 
systems 
 
 1992 2001 increase 1992 2001 increase 
Cochabamba 44 63 19 45 67 21 
La Paz 58 72 14 37 57 20 
Source: World Bank 2004 
 
Some critics claim that the “growth” as shown in these numbers does not account for the 
peripheries of the cities (Poupeau and Hardy 2016: 2). This is significant because the population 
of El Alto, the satellite city of La Paz, increased from about 250,000 in 1985 to 650,000 in 2001 
(Spronk 2007). Data shows that Aguas del Illimani succeeded in expanding improved water 
systems within the “served area” of the contract, but this area did not include the majority of the 
periphery citizens. Parts of El Alto were considered inside of the “served area,” however, 
200,000 people lived outside the “served area,” and without recognizing these people in the data 
above, the percent increase would be significantly less (Spronk 2007: 20). Table 3 shows the 
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increase of densification instead of expansion of water connections in El Alto, meaning that the 
number of connections increased within areas that were already serviced, instead of expanding to 
new areas.  
 
Table 3: Domestic potable water and sewerage connections in El Alto (up until 2006) 
El Alto Coverage by 
2006 (%) 
Densification Expansion Difference (in 
%) 
Domestic 
potable water 
connections 
100 21,001 5,327 80/20 
Domestic 
sewerage 
connections 
100 6,500 7,321 47/53 
Source: Laurie and Crespo,2007 
 
The table separates the number of sewerage and potable water connections until 2006 
into two categories: “densification” and “expansion”. Densification indicates the connections 
that were created within areas of the city that already had houses connected and did not have 
trouble with water access. Expansion indicates that the new water connections expanded beyond 
the reach of the water infrastructure before the privatization of the water company. The 
“difference in percent” is the percentage of the new connections that are classified as 
“densification” versus those that are considered “expansion”.  
The table also shows that 80% of the growth in potable water connections was actually 
only densification within areas that were already served and 20% classified as expansion, instead 
of expanding the water system to reach more people. Essentially, 80% of the new connections 
that Aguas del Illimani created were in areas that already had access to potable water before 
privatization, and only 20% of the new connections were in areas that were not previously 
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provided water access through the municipal water lines. These data show that Aguas del 
Illimani focused its investment in areas that it could make more revenue by selling water to them 
and ignoring the areas of the city that did not already have access. The “expansion” that Aguas 
del Illimani was required to reach in the contract signed with the Bolivian government was not in 
fact the expansion that was intended by the pro-poor contract. 
 
Table 4: Water and Sanitation Coverage by Type of Supply (Percent of Households) 
 1997 2001 
Water Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Improved 71% 94% 37% 72% 90% 44% 
House 
connections 
19% 31% 2% 29% 43% 6% 
Yard 
connections 
46% 58% 27% 39% 45% 29% 
Standpipes 6% 5% 8% 4% 2% 9% 
Other 29% 6% 63% 28% 10% 56% 
Sanitation       
Improved 59% 78% 31% 67% 84% 40% 
Sewerage 29% 46% 2% 31% 48% 3% 
Septic 
tanks 
10% 14% 3% 10% 14% 4% 
Pit Latrines 21% 18% 26% 26% 21% 34% 
Other/ 
without 
service 
41% 22% 69% 33% 16% 60% 
Source: World Bank 2004 
 Table 4 has a breakdown of each type of water source implemented for all of Bolivia. It 
shows that while there was an increase in access across the board, there were more connections 
added than people who gained access from the privatization. According to The World Bank’s 
Bolivia Public Expenditure Management for Fiscal Sustainability and Equitable and Efficient 
Public Services report, the 4% decrease in percentage of people with access to improved water 
coverage in urban areas from 94% to 90% between 1997 and 2001 is accounted for by the 
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significant increase in urbanization during that time period (World Bank 2004: 174). The 
200,000 people that lived outside of the “served area” in El Alto are a part of the population that 
caused the percent decrease shown in the table.  
 In the case of La Paz, Franck Poupeau and Sébastien Hardy disagree that population 
increase is the only reason for a 4% decrease in household accessibility. In their article, “The 
social conditions of self-organized utilities” water cooperatives in La Paz and El Alto, Bolivia” 
they claim that the decrease in percentage in overall water and sanitation coverage is not only 
from an increase in population, but also a conscious decision on the part of Aguas del Illimani to 
invest in areas within the city in which profits were guaranteed. These profitable areas landed 
within proper city limits, that the company had the privilege of dictating, and therefore were the 
only areas considered when its contribution to the expansion of water systems was measured 
(Poupeau and Hardy 2016). As such, the company increased the number of household 
connections, but only in the wealthy areas of the city so that the poor peripheries were left out of 
the improvements they helped build (Poupeau and Hardy 2016: 9). The World Bank Report 
supports this theory when it explains that “richer households are almost two and a half times 
more likely to have water and sanitation services compared to households in the bottom quintile” 
(World Bank 2004: 174). This disparity in income and access to water and sanitation services is 
shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Access to Water and Sanitation-Distribution of Households by Income in La Paz, 2001 
(Percent of households in quintile with access) 
 Poor 
1 2 3 4 
Rich 
5 Overall 
Improved 
Water 
Coverage 
      
Total 36 59 71 80 88 72 
Urban 76 83 87 88 95 90 
Rural 26 34 39 52 59 44 
Sanitation 
service 
coverage 
      
Total 34 60 69 82 91 67 
Urban 73 76 80 88 95 84 
Rural 26 44 48 65 69 40 
Source: World Bank 2004 
This table shows the difference in access to water and sanitation service coverage in 
relation to household income. Not only is access within the urban sector higher than the access 
for people in the rural sector, 90% of households compared to 44% of households respectively, 
but access for people in the bottom quintile of the urban sector is 19% lower than that of the top 
quintile, 76% and 95% respectively. The income gaps between citizens within each sector and 
between citizens in different sectors correlate with the amount of water access. This can be 
explained by location, as people with different incomes reside in different areas of the city and 
therefore Aguas del Illimani focused on the areas of the city that had higher incomes in order to 
make more profit for itself.  
The World Bank Implementation Completion Report of the Major Cities Water and 
Sewerage Rehabilitation Project specifies the priority level of the sewage implementation as 
higher than that of the potable water priority. The political uprisings against Illimani, however, 
were not because of the sewerage connections, they were because of the price hikes in water 
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during their tenure in La Paz and El Alto (Spronk 2007). While sewerage infrastructure is 
important for the overall health of citizens in a city, potable water access is important as well. 
The social movements that resulted in the Bolivian government ousting Aguas del Illimani were 
movements fighting for water access, not for sewerage infrastructure. This shows that water 
access is on the forefront of citizens’ minds and therefore should be a financial and investment 
priority. 
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Results of Water Policy 
The privatization of the water system in Bolivia caused price hikes both before and after 
the actual sale to Aguas del Illimani. In December 1996, the government increased the prices by 
57.7% in “preparation” for the sale in order to pad the price hikes again after the purchase 
(Laurie and Crespo 2007). The water privatization in La Paz is considered to be “pro-poor” and 
as such the price system was set up in a way to protect the poor from paying too much in water 
bills. Table 6 shows the price set up for Aguas del Illimani and its goal to charge users who 
consumed higher volumes of water higher prices than those who used smaller amounts of water. 
 
Table 6: Water Usage Prices for Aguas del Illimani and SAMAPA 
Water Usage Value ($US/m3) User Category (m3) 
  Domestic Commercial Industrial 
Aguas del 
Illimani 
    
High 1.1862 301 or more 21 or more 1 or more 
Medium-High 0.6642 151 to 300 1 to 20  
Medium 0.4428 31 to 150   
Low 0.2214 1 to 30   
SEMAPA     
High 0.9964 301 or more 21 or more 1 or more 
Medium-High 0.5579 151 to 300 1 to 20  
Medium 0.3719 31 to 150   
Low 0.9964 1 to 30   
Source: Laurie and Crespo 2007 
As is shown in the table, Aguas del Illimani charged $1.1862/m3 for users that used 
higher volumes of water (301 or more m3) while SAMAPA, the public water company before 
privatization, only charged $0.9964/m3 to those same users. Aguas del Illimani charged medium-
high (151 to 300 m3) volume users $0.6642/m3 and SAMAPA would charge the same customers 
$0.5579/m3. The trend continues for Medium volume (31 to 150 m3) users but switches for Low 
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volume users. SAMAPA charges low volume (1 to 30 m3) users $0.9964/m3 just like the High 
volume users while Aguas del Illimani charges $0.2214/m3 to the lowest volume users. 
These prices support the “pro-poor” classification of Aguas del Illimani, giving higher 
prices to those users that can supposedly afford it as they use higher volumes of water and giving 
price breaks to those users that cannot afford to use much water. The problem that Laurie and 
Crespo found in their article “Deconstructing the Best Case Scenario: Lessons from Water 
Politics in La Paz-El Alto Bolivia” is that there were no water meters in the areas in which the 
poor lived (Laurie and Crespo 2007: 846). Therefore, the lowest users were having to pay a flat 
rate regardless of water usage, preventing them from taking advantage of the decreased water 
prices. Within El Alto, the households with meters paid between $0.75 and $0.88 USD monthly 
per connection, reflecting their low usage, in comparison to the houses without meters that paid 
$2.38 USD monthly per connection (Laure and Crespo 2007:846). 
  Laurie and Crespo continue to unearth hidden costs for water consumers in the “pro-
poor” concession in La Paz and El Alto. They explain that the charges for water include the 2% 
state regulation tax, the monthly billing costs (which increased from $0.1 to $0.22 USD between 
2001 and 2005), and the “dollarization of tariffs” also hid the 35% increase in real costs between 
1997 and 2004 (Laurie and Crespo 2007). All of these hidden costs together with set rates 
without water meters explain how five percent of periphery household budgets, in neighborhoods 
such as Alto Tembladerani, are spent on water access (Poupeau and Hardy 2016:11). 
 The increase in prices combined with the lack of transparency in the Aguas del Illimani 
contract to create an unsatisfied public and eventually the ousting of the company. Between 
opening the bidding for the sale of the water system in La Paz-El Alto and Aguas del Illimani 
signing the contract, prices increased by 20% (Laurie and Crespo 2007). These price hikes 
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amounted to $3.6 million USD in profit for Aguas del Illimani and projected profits of $157 
million USD in the 30 years the company was contracted to control the water systems in La Paz-
El Alto (Laurie and Crespo 2007). An important factor to compare in the contract that Aguas del 
Illimani signed is that the water regulator and the company were the only two parties involved in 
the creation of the contract. The Water Regulator and the Sanitation Superintendent were also the 
same person, so it was easy for the Water Regulator to team with Aguas del Illimani for the most 
profit rather than the best interests of the citizens (Laurie and Crespo 2007:850).  
 The privatization movement in Bolivia included services other than water (electricity, gas 
etc.) and in the process, by recommendation of the World Bank, decreased their labor 
significantly, leaving over 31,000 public service workers without jobs throughout the country 
(Spronk 2007). When laying off these workers, companies offered to allow workers to buy the 
“preferential shares” in the newly privatized companies, however the shares owned by Suez, the 
World Bank and Banco Mercantil gained more interest, meaning that the laid off workers only 
gained 5 bolivianos (under $1 USD) each year (Spronk 2007: 20). 
 
Bolivian Ecological Story 
Bolivia’s water system, already plagued with economic inefficiencies, is also suffering 
ecological problems. Late last year, 2016, the Bolivian government declared the lack of water a 
national emergency as they suffered their worst drought in 25 years. Rationing was implemented 
and citizens only have access to water for three hours a day (Walker 2016). In January 2017, 
news sources reported a two-month water shortage in La Paz (Martinez 2017). As in Chile, 
pollution, climate change and lack of infrastructure cause the citizens to experience extreme 
water shortages and rationing throughout the year. La Paz is the largest city in the world at its 
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altitude of 4,000 meters, making the city’s options for water limited while also creating a 
dangerous living situation for the people who live in the periphery. The steep slopes that 
surround La Paz make for settlements that are at risk of landslides in the event of heavy rainfall 
and earthquakes, but they also have a unique problem in the logistics of water provision. Water 
infrastructure often depends on gravity to carry water to homes, and the steep peripheries make 
infrastructure hard to build. 
 The drought Bolivia is currently facing has two of the three water reservoirs for La Paz 
down to 8% capacity, the third reservoir resting at 1% capacity (Walker 2016). In 2016, Lake 
Poopó dried up, costing the country its second largest lake and water source. Many people blame 
the overuse and pollution of water resources on the mining companies that operate upstream 
from the lake, causing the lake to desiccate (Martinez 2017). This is just one example of the 
ways Bolivia is suffering water scarcity. 
Glaciers are the main source of potable water for the city of La Paz, the majority of which 
are shrinking worldwide. The glaciers of the Cordillera Real mountain range around La Paz 
supply the city with up to 40% of its water supply (Rangecroft, Harrison and Anderson 2015). 
Between 1987 and 2010, the glacier coverage in the mountain range decreased by 34.5% (Liu, 
Kinouchi, and Ledezma 2013: 162). This decrease in size leads to less water resources for the 
country to draw from in order to supply it to its citizens. Furthermore, the “accepted notion that a 
glacier retreats faster as it becomes smaller” should be taken into account, predicting that water 
scarcity is only going to worsen in coming decades (Liu et al 2013: 162). It is estimated that two 
of the glaciers that feed the La Paz water supply will disappear by 2030 (Walker 2016). 
In order to supply La Paz with water in the future, the government will most likely have 
to invest heavily in water reservoirs as well as desalinization plants. Water is heavy and hard to 
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transport, especially with the city being as high in altitude as it is. Desalinization is expensive but 
it would offer an alternative for the mining companies that use large volumes of potable water. 
Larger reservoirs would help collect the rainwater that until now has been wasted by being 
allowed to flow away from the city. Also, if the Bolivian government could keep pollution out of 
Lake Titicaca, it may be able to use those water resources to provide for La Paz. 
On top of growing glacier thinning, the urban expansion of the city is threatening the 
water quality of the Katari watershed. The Katari watershed feeds both La Paz and El Alto and 
empties into Lake Titicaca. El Alto, home to around 5000 industries, has wastewater collection 
and wastewater treatment plants to cover 50% of the wastewater it produces (Archundia et al. 
2017: 4). Subsequently the water that passes through the city to reenter the watershed has seven 
times the natural river flow including high bacterial activity and high nutrient levels (meaning 
high levels of phosphate and ammonium) (Archundia et al 2017:14). The main reservoir for the 
city of La Paz is the Milluni Lake, which receives its water from the glaciers in the Cordillera 
along with the wastewater from mining plants farther upstream. The wastewater in the Seke 
River (part of the Katari watershed) causes the water meant for La Paz citizens to be extremely 
acidic (Archundia et al 2017),  “the whole Katari watershed, from downstream Milluni Valley to 
Cohana Bay, appeared not to be suitable for any type of activity, be that drinking water for 
humans or cattle or for irrigation purposes” (Archundia et al 2017: 44). Furthermore, the La Paz 
river basin suffers from the deforestation that has been increasing by 2 km2 a year since 1991, 
which leads to increased runoff from the nearby land, including farms, and causes water 
pollution from the dirt as well as the chemicals used for agriculture (Escurra, Vazquez, Cestti, De 
Nys, and Srinivasan 2014: 735).  
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The reason for bringing attention to water scarcity in Bolivia is to show that water policy 
needs to be monitored and modernized in order for places in areas such as this to continue to 
have access to water. The nature of water as a natural resource and an absolute necessity for 
human life will cause it to be the most controversial product on Earth very soon. Even though the 
Bolivian government could not successfully implement privatization in the water sector, Bolivia, 
and La Paz are experiencing the same problems with water scarcity as Santiago, Chile. My 
analysis will look at these two cases as they pertain to privatization and water scarcity as these 
countries look forward to supplying water to their increasingly growing cities. 
The water scarcity that both Santiago and La Paz are experiencing may not be a direct 
result of the water privatizations in each city, but it is obvious that water privatization is not a 
solution to water scarcity. Whether water privatization led to social uprisings or a successful 
water market and fair allocation of resources, neither system achieved water scarcity protection 
for its citizens. Today, governments can no longer avoid this part of water policy. Water scarcity 
will need to be addressed soon in order to provide for the large populations in Santiago and La 
Paz. 
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ANALYSIS 
With this thesis I wanted to answer the question: Why has Bolivia had so many problems 
with water availability? As I looked into water availability and water policy in Latin America I 
found that Chile, Bolivia’s neighbor was able to implement a major water market privatization 
effort. After finding this I wanted to know how Chile had managed to implement these changes 
so fluidly while Bolivia’s policy change resulted in what is called the “Cochabamba Water War”, 
which subsequently spread to La Paz and resulted in the expulsion of the international water 
companies in both cities. The abrupt privatization and sale of the water utility in La Paz to an 
international company caused a surge in prices that resulted in revenue for the company that was 
not distributed throughout the city to benefit all users. The water policy changes in Santiago 
before the implementation of water privatization in 1999 provided universal water access for its 
citizens and allowed for the transfer to privatization to go smoothly. The smooth transition in 
Santiago however did not create a system in which the sustainability of water resources was 
protected. Neither water framework resulted in the decreased water use. Water scarcity should be 
the focus of the water frameworks moving forward in water policy thought. Through my 
research I have discovered why the privatization of water resources did not succeed in Bolivia, 
and why water policy change in Chile was successful and the subsequent privatization of water 
resources did not cause the same social unrest as it did in Bolivia. 
First, the international aid packages offered to each country in the time of water system 
rehabilitation and privatization should be take into account. The World Bank gave significant 
packages to both Bolivia and Chile in an effort to help them improve their water systems. By 
looking into the specific projects we can see that the projects implemented in Santiago and La 
Paz show a significant difference in financial aid. The first aid package given to EMOS in 1980 
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was 65 million US$ while the package granted to La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz in 
Bolivia in 1990 totaled 35 million US$ (Pflieger 2008: 32) (World Bank 1998: i). Chile also 
received a second package for continued water system improvement in 1986 for and additional 
53.68 million US$, this project specifically for Santiago (World Bank 1996: 1). 
The Bolivian project in 1990 did not have as much revenue nor as much success as the 
Chilean projects. The World Bank ICR of the 1990 Major Cities and Sewerage Rehabilitation 
Project describes that by the project end date in 1996 “the water company of La Paz and 
SEMAPA, the water Company of Cochabamba, had barely initiated the implementation of their 
components, which were only completed after two extensions of closing dates” (World Bank 
1998: iii). With the extensions of a year and six months, SEMAPA had completed the original 
project goals but not in Cochabamba (World Bank 1998).  
Second, the two Chilean water system projects were dedicated solely to Santiago and 
were installed before the privatization of the water company. This allowed EMOS to invest 
directly into the expansion of the water system which provided access to more citizens instead of 
just profit for the company. That being said, by the second project in 1986, EMOS was funding 
itself from the revenue it was making from the changed price system it implemented in the early 
1980s 
 After the limited success of this project by 1996, the World Bank conditioned the 
extension of the loans on the privatization of SAMAPA during that time (World Bank 1998). 
Therefore, the Bolivian government had signed a concession with Aguas del Illimani before the 
end of the project, and before any real price system or company reorganization could take place. 
Bolivia sold water the La Paz company to an international company by signing a concession in 
which the government granted the company full water rights for 40 years.  
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 The difference here between Chile and Bolivia is that the Bolivian government brought 
privatization to its water systems as a requirement set by the World Bank who wished for it to be 
the solution to its water system inefficiencies. Chile on the other hand, implemented significant 
changes to assure universal water access throughout Santiago before allowing the water company 
to be privatized. The privatization of SEMAPA in La Paz led to the incentive for profit over 
water provision to the citizens while EMOS, with the financial autonomy given to it by the 
World Bank, was able to focus on the water provision for its citizens within Santiago. 
Even though the Bolivian concessions had “pro-poor” requirements in the contracts, 
Aguas del Illimani was able to find a loophole in the requirement for expansion by only 
increasing the amounts of connections within the rich neighborhoods in order to make a profit 
rather than increase water access for poor citizens. The sale of the Bolivian water company to an 
international company created the commodification of water, ignoring the social aspect of water 
resources. The immediate transition into privatization of water resources is what prevented the 
sustainability of the water system in La Paz because the new company implemented price 
changes that that would fund expansion as well as generate revenue for the company. 
Third, the price hikes in La Paz happened rapidly as the government increased prices 
57.7% in 1996, in preparation for privatization. The subsidized prices came with Aguas del 
Illimani instead of with SEMAPA, so the profits went directly to the company rather than to a 
government entity with the goal of increasing access to all citizens.  
In contrast, Chile changed their water systems over a course of 19 years (1980 to 1999), 
so the price fluctuations happened slowly over time, and were also mitigated by subsidies 
included in the system for poor users. In the 1980s EMOS began the price system in which the 
higher prices for higher usage subsidized the lower prices for the lower usage so that when, in 
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1990 the average price of water was 50% higher than in 1989, wealthier water users had already 
adjusted to higher water prices. The subsidized price system was made possible by CORFO, a 
national company with a mission to spark economic development in Chile, rather than an 
international company focused on revenue. 
Fourth, Chile also had the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS), the 
autonomous entity responsible for naming rates, supervising technical norms, and maintaining 
quality control (Pflieger 2008). The SISS regulated water companies throughout Chile and was 
in place before the privatization in 1999, so it helped hold both EMOS and then Aguas de 
Barcelona-Suez after privatization accountable for water supply to all citizens. By setting prices 
it gave the companies incentives to remain efficient in order to keep its prices below the set price 
in order to make a profit but also allowed them to make profits if they functioned efficiently 
enough for their cost of production to be lower than the set price. 
In contrast, the lack of transparency between Aguas del Illimani and the Bolivian 
government allowed the company to falsify data that described the reach of the water system and 
contributed to the corruption between the water superintendent (responsible for deciding what 
the water company can and cannot do in order to provide universal water access for citizens) and 
water regulator (responsible for managing the concessions between the government and the 
water company in order to hold company to contract) who in the case of Bolivia were the same 
person, and the company (Laurie and Crespo 2007). The water superintendent/ water regulator 
permitted Illimani to change prices as it pleased since the superintendent/regulator was the only 
one the company had to answer to on behalf of the Bolivian government (Laurie and Crespo 
2007). Corruption led to the revenue that the company made from the higher prices not being 
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invested into the water infrastructure to bring water to more citizens, but rather turning into 
profits pocketed by the company and water superintendent. 
Fifth, the relative economic statuses of Bolivia and Chile at the time of water policy 
change may have impacted the level of success of the implemented changes. The Bolivian GDP 
in the year of privatization for La Paz, 1997, was 7.926 billion (current US$) while the GDP in 
Chile the year of water policy changes,1980, was 27.572 billion (World Bank 2016). Chile had 
much more capital to invest in its water system and therefore could leverage more power in the 
process of water policy changes. Bolivia on the other hand needed much more financial aid and 
therefore was unable to dictate the conditions of the aid the World Bank granted it and 
subsequently the concession it signed with Aguas de Illimani. 
By the time the foreign consortium Aguas de Barcelona-Suez bought 51% of the shares 
in 1999, EMOS had already set the framework for the company so that it was making profits 
while still supplying affordable water to all of the citizens in Santiago. Essentially, unlike in La 
Paz, privatization of EMOS was not driven by the desire to spark international investments to 
expand water access, instead water access expansion was achieved by national investment and 
national company reconstruction and privatization was the result. After the rehabilitation of the 
water system by EMOS in the 1980s and 1990s, Aguas de Barcelona-Suez bought 51% of the 
shares for 960 million US$ (Pflieger 2008). EMOS’s revamping of the water system in Santiago 
increased the water company’s value and led to the foreign direct investment that the Bolivian 
water privatization project aimed to obtain. 
 In the debates arguing for the privatization of water resources such as those presented 
earlier by Maestu and Perry et al. many of the problems that they aim to solve by implementing 
privatization remained in problems after the privatization of the water systems in Santiago and 
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La Paz. One of the problems Perry et al. introduced as a result of water being controlled by the 
public sector is corruption. The research I have done shows that even with privatization in La 
Paz, corruption remained a problem, and Santiago was able to avoid corruption with its 
autonomous body, the SSIS. While privatization did bring foreign direct investment into La Paz 
and Santiago when their water companies were sold to international companies, it did not 
encourage users to limit their usage (Santiago) nor did it give those water companies the 
incentive to expand water supply while improving water service. A successful example of the 
subsidized price system proposed by Perry et al. is seen in the Santiago case with EMOS before 
privatization. Water prices in Chile in 2012, after privatization, were recorded as the highest in 
Latin America, showing that privatization did not result in affordable universal potable water 
access (Bland 2013). 
 The privatization of water resources in La Paz resulted in the expulsion of Aguas del 
Ilimani while the results of the privatization of EMOS are still being seen today. Aguas Andinas 
provides water to 6 million of the 7.2 million citizens in Santiago, with water prices higher than 
any other in Latin America (Gallagher 2016: 1). According to Francisca Fernández, spokewoman 
of El Movimiento por la Recuperación del Agua y la Vida, “privatization of water has kept prices 
unnecessarily high, delivered por service and done Little to address concerns over insufficient 
supply in the future” (Gallagher 2016: 1). Protests as large as 2,000 people in the streets of 
Santiago are evidence that the privatization EMOS in Santiago has not had the results experts 
hoped it would (Gallagher 2016). 
 My research supports Cohen and Peterson’s ideas of institutional pluralism. EMOS in 
Santiago is the case that most closely resembles institutional pluralism. The SSIS dictated the 
market, setting prices so that EMOS and other water suppliers had to provide affordable water 
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access to the citizens of Santiago. Furthermore, the public company was directly invested in the 
development of Santiago as a city and therefore focused on water provision rather than profit. 
The price system allowed for wealthier users to subsidize the water access of poorer users and 
the profits were reinvested directly into the water sector in order to continue the expansion of 
water access for citizens of Santiago. In order for people to retain their water access, no one 
entity can be in charge of water allocation. Water is too precious of a resource to be turned into 
solely and economic good, the social ramifications must be considered and water resources must 
be protected. 
 
Ecological Issues and Mounting Problems of Scarcity and Pollution 
Although Chile was able to create a water system within Santiago that allowed water 
allocation to all of its citizens before privatization, the privatization of water the water system in 
1999 did not bring about the protection of water resources like many supporters of water 
privatization believed would happen. Instead, the private companies are more interested in the 
profit from increased water sales over the sustainability of water resources. The water 
privatization in Bolivia, even though it failed, did not lead to reduced water use either.  
Glacier retreat has continued in both areas and the cities are starting to see the results of 
this decrease in water resources. Citizens of La Paz have days without water and their drought 
has been deemed a national emergency (Walker 2016). Citizens in Santiago suffer days without 
water as high rainfall causes flooding of the river basin and the contamination of their water 
resources. The privatization of water resources in Chile and Bolivia did not serve its purpose as a 
solution to water scarcity, nor did it cause investment into preventative measures to protect their 
water resources from contamination. The physical delivery of water resources is no longer the 
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only concern for governments anymore, the prevention of water scarcity is becoming more 
important as climate change and pollution threaten water resources. 
Mining companies are using high percentages of water resources as well as 
contaminating water resources for citizens (Aitken, Rivera, Godoy-Faúndez, Holzapfel 2016). 
The governments of Chile and Bolivia both need to focus resources on finding alternate 
resources for the mining companies to use and/or limit their use of clean water as well as control 
their proximity to the big metropolitan areas. Mining companies are contributing significantly to 
the water scarcity problem in both cities as they are generally placed uphill from the cities and 
their discharge affects both water quality and quantity.  
In Santiago, Chile, where the privatized water company Aguas Andinas has had control over the 
water systems since 1999, we can see how privatization has not led to reduced water usage by 
consumers. Data show that consumers use on average 53,000 m3 of potable water per person per 
year, which is twenty-five times more that is needed for sustainable development (Lagorio 
2014b: 1). These data are evidence of what Lagorio calls the “over-exploitation of water basins 
and a misuse of water rights” that has taken place in Santiago since the privatization of EMOS in 
1999 (Lagorio 2014a: 1). 
 As discussed earlier, Hoekstra et al. shows the importance of water footprints in the 
overall picture of water resource sustainability. If cities overuse their water resources, the 
ecological health of the river basins will be threatened and water scarcity will ensue. This is the 
process we can see today in Santiago and La Paz. Water resources are becoming scarce as 
glaciers retreat and growing populations put more strain on water resources. Since urban 
populations are growing, decreasing water usage is not enough to protect water resources. A 
decrease in excess water use would help protect water resources, but if water provision for basic 
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necessities creates a water footprint that negatively affects water resources in the vicinity of a 
city, then more measures need to be taken to ensure water resource sustainability. 
 Chile is looking into desalinization plants for mining companies in order for freshwater 
resources to be used solely for citizens’ use. Josefina Maestu discussed desalinization as a 
solution to water scarcity and California’s efforts to use it to provide water to its citizens since 
the state has been facing water scarcity for years (Maestu 2013: 50). Desalinization is the process 
of removing salt, and other chemicals from water to produce fresh, potable water. The problem 
Californian cities faced is that desalinization also includes the desalinization of wastewater. 
While recycling water resources would be an ideal solution to water scarcity, the general public, 
once they realized that their drinking water was recycled wastewater, they protested 
desalinization as an acceptable form of water service (Maestu 2013).  
 Maestu’s book also covers solutions such as underground water storage, recycled 
municipal water and urban conservation. Underground water storage would allow water to be 
collected in the rainy seasons and stored until its use in dry seasons. It is an environmentally 
friendly option that can be stored and used in different areas. One of the worries however is 
contamination from surface water runoff. Additionally, draw and recharge speeds are dependent 
on gravity and rainfall patterns (Maestu 2013). 
 Recycled municipal water would allow used water to be used for purposes that do not 
necessarily require potable water, such as landscaping and outdoor cleaning. Water recycling 
however would require significant investment into new infrastructure as water with different 
levels of quality would require different plumbing. There is also a questions of public safety as 
children play outside and environmental effects as runoff would not go to treatment plants and 
water could potentially contaminate river basins (Maestu 2013).  
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 Finally, urban conservation is the idea of preventing excess water usage through 
education and water usage regulations such as fees for overuse. This form of water conservation 
is best aligned with Bichieri-Colombi’s WINE framework. These methods are both centered 
around the idea of decreasing water usage by a change in public thought as it pertains to water. If 
these ideas were implemented in Santiago and La Paz, the wealthier users would not be able to 
consume more water than is necessary for hygienic use. Water planners would be “decision 
makers over the Earth” and water would no longer be considered a commodity but instead a 
luxury.  
 In the privatization framework, water resource sustainability was expected to come as a 
result of market forces decreasing water consumption. Decreased water usage however, was not 
a result and privatization actually led to the over-use of water resources (Lagorio 2014b). 
Institutional pluralism would allow multiple regulatory bodies to dictate water usage as the 
government, as well as public and private companies would be required to operate under a 
mandate for decreased water usage. Autonomous bodies such as the SSIS would enforce market 
restrictions in which companies would only be allowed to sell a certain amount of water, but 
market forces would allow each company to compete to keep water prices low for citizens. The 
government would most likely have to subsidize this form of water market, but the sustainability 
of water resources and therefore the sustainability of each society would be the benefits of such a 
framework. Desalination, although expensive, may be a required action for La Paz as the city’s 
water resources become scarce and the population continues to grow. Santiago has access to 
more water resources so it may be able to reach water resource sustainability by implementing a 
myriad of these proposed strategies. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This study has analyzed privatization as a solution to water allocation in urban 
settlements as well as a solution to increasing global water scarcity. In order to answer this 
question, I focused on secondary sources that have analyzed the economic and social results of 
water policy changes in Santiago, Chile and La Paz, Bolivia as they pertained to water 
privatization. Previous research has been conducted on the effectiveness of privatization in 
economic and social contexts in Chile and in Bolivia but the two have not been compared nor 
has research examined the ecological results of privatization. 
 I started my research by investigating the Cochabamba Water Wars and the water 
policies that led to social unrest since this is a representative example of problems with water 
access within Bolivia. As I looked into the water policy changes in Bolivia I found that the water 
privatization in La Paz lasted longer than the attempted privatization in Cochabamba and 
therefore had more potential for understanding the individual aspects of the policy changes. The 
majority of the literature on the privatization of water in Bolivia is critical of the attempted 
privatization, as it did not provide water access to all of its citizens. The literature on water 
scarcity of the area is minimal and empirical, showing the causes of water scarcity, but does not 
connect water scarcity to water policy. The literature that connects privatization to the prevention 
of water scarcity treats ecological effects as a “bonus” to water privatization in addition to 
achieving efficiency of water allocation through the market.  
 When trying to find a way to improve the water systems in Bolivia I was directed towards 
the water market in Chile as it is only one of three countries that separates water rights from land 
rights, allowing water rights to be treated as an economic good. The water projects that were 
implemented with the loans given by the World Bank, succeeded in providing water access to 
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more citizens at an affordable price. Through secondary sources I researched the water policy 
changes in all of Chile, the effects in Santiago and finally the ecological effects.  
 The preparation by EMOS before the privatization in Santiago allowed the citizens to 
adapt to the higher prices for water since they increased slowly over time. The Water Code of 
1981 created a system in which public company, EMOS could operate as a private company with 
WUR in a water market. The biggest investor in EMOS was CORFO, a public company invested 
in the economic development of Chile, that allowed for EMOS to implement a price system that 
would subsidize the poor users in the city. All of these factors came together to create a water 
system in which more consumers were able to get affordable potable water. 
 The lack of preparation in Bolivia for the water privatization in the late 1990s created an 
environment in which the citizens in Cochabamba and La Paz could not afford the swift price 
hikes and led them to revolt against the private water company. Additionally, the companies that 
were in charge of the water systems in these countries were given rights for 30 years and 
guaranteed profit for that time period, so even though they were brought into the country to help 
bring water to the citizens that did not previously have it, the companies focused instead on 
predicted profitable areas through which they could generate revenue.  
 Finally, I looked into the ecological situations of the water resources in each city today 
and have found that both cities are experiencing water scarcity from climate change and 
retreating glaciers as well as a lack of infrastructure to protect water resources from 
contamination. Heavy rains and landslides threaten the settlements on the slopes of the 
mountains that surround both cities and mining companies threaten the water resources with 
over-usage and pollutants. Water policy will need to focus on protecting water resources in the 
coming years as they become more endangered. 
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 It is for these situations that I recommend a new water policy be put into place based on 
institutional pluralism and following the Chilean model. Under water policy, the water company 
can work like a private entity but the investors are local so that the company keeps a social 
perspective throughout their business. I also propose investment into water infrastructure to 
protect rivers from heavy runoff during storms, as well as technology such as water meters and 
desalinization plants to help minimize the wasteful use of potable water resources. I think that 
institutional pluralism, which allows the government to set up a market in which public sector 
goods can be sold with a social conscience and participate in the market as a private entity would 
be a good framework off of which to base water policy for developing nations. The hybridization 
of the Chilean water company EMOS is a good example of company with public interests being 
allowed to function as a private company. Perhaps not privatizing the company and 
implementing policies within the water sector that limits the amount of water it is allowed to sell 
would help limit water usage and therefore protect the sustainability of water resources. 
Transparency and checks and balances are incredibly important so that wealth and public good 
are spread equally throughout society. Finally I suggest that individual roles within the water 
system, such as a water superintendent and water regulator, be different individuals.  
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